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Blind quantum computation allows a client without enough quantum technologies to delegate her
quantum computation to quantum server, while keeping her input, output and algorithm secure.
In this paper, we propose a universal single-server and classical-client blind quantum computation
protocol based on entanglement swapping technology. In our protocol, the client interface with
only one server and the only ability of the client requires is to get particles from trusted center
and forward them to the server. Moreover, the protocol can be modified to make client completely
classical by improving the ability of the trusted center. Numbers of blind quantum computation
protocols have been presented in recent years, including single-, double- and triple-server protocols.
In the single-server protocol, client needs to prepare single qubits. Though client can be classical in
the double-server protocol, the two servers, who share Bell state from trusted center, are not allowed
to communicate with each other. Recently, the triple-server protocol solves the noncommunication
problem. Three servers, however, make the implementation of the computation sophisticated and
unrealistic. Since it is impossible for blind quantum computation with only classical client and
single server, blind quantum computation may work in the “Cloud + E-commerce” style in the
future. Our protocol might become a key ingredient for real-life application in the first generation
of quantum computations.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Lx, 03.65.Ud
Quantum computation has been considered to solve
tough computation problems for classical computers with
the development of quantum technology [1–3]. Although
vast technological developments have already allowed
for small-scale quantum computers with photonic, ionic,
solid-state, and superconducting systems, it may be a
long way to build large-scale quantum computers because
the hurdles encountered in realizing quantum devices are
enormous at present. The intrinsic technical complexity
result in the use of the first-generation quantum comput-
ers being likely to “cloud” style [4]. A limited number of
costly and powerful quantum servers will be only avail-
able in remote academia, corporations, and governments.
A great number of clients, who have no enough quantum
technology, have to delegate their quantum computations
to the quantum servers. The security of client’s informa-
tion is extremely significant in this model. It should be
guaranteed that the server (Bob) learns nothing about
the inputs, outputs, or desired computation of the client
(Alice). Then blind quantum computation (BQC) was
put forward to meet the requirements.
Based on quantum circuit model, Childs presented the
first BQC protocol [5] where Alice needs to have quantum
memory and the ability to perform SWAP gate. Arrighi
and Salvail proposed another BQC protocol [6] where
Alice needs to prepare and measure multiqubit entan-
gled states. This protocol is not a universal one which
is only for the calculation of certain classical function,
and Bob can obtain some information if he does not
mind being caught. Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi
(BFK) presented the first universal BQC protocol [7]
which does not require any quantum computation power
or memory on the client’s side. The client only needs
to be able to generate single qubits, and her information
can be unconditionally secure. Inspired by this, various
BQC protocols have been proposed, such as the protocol
based on the Afflick-Kennedy-Lieb-Tasaki state [8–10],
continuous-variable measurement-based quantum com-
putation [11, 12], and the ancilla-driven model [13, 14].
In the above BQC protocols, the client needs to possess
some quantum resource or technology, such as the abil-
ity to own quantum memory, generate quantum qubit,
or perform measurement. The BFK BQC protocol can
be modified to a double-server protocol [7], where Alice
can be completely classical if the two servers who share
Bell pairs do not communicate with each other. Morimea
and Fujii showed that entanglement distillation in the
double-server scheme does not degrading the security of
blind quantum computing [15]. However, the two servers
are not allowed to communicate in both of the two mod-
ified protocols. Recently, Li et al. [16] showed that the
noncommunicable requirement between the two servers
can be removed if one more server can be imported. The
triple-server BQC protocol is based on the technique of
entanglement swapping [17–21], and the three servers are
allowed to communicate with each other and the client is
almost classical, which only needs to be able to get access
to quantum channel. However, it is complex and unreal-
istic that a client needs to interact with up to three quan-
tum servers. In this paper, we will show that only one
quantum sever is enough to implement the quantum com-
putation, where the client can be classical and keep her
information private. Based on this protocol and Ref. [22],
we propose a new “Cloud + E-commerce” style for blind
quantum computation, in this way classical clients can
acquire quantum computation conveniently.
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2Before proceeding to our protocol, let us briefly review
the BFK BQC protocol in Ref. [7], modified double-server
BQC protocol in Ref. [15] and triple-server BQC protocol
in Ref. [16] first. Suppose that the client Alice needs to
implement quantum computation on the m-qubit graph
state corresponding to the graph G. The quantum op-
eration that Alice wants to perform is to measure the
ith qubit in the basis {|0〉 ± eiφi |1〉}, where φi ∈ S ≡
{kpi/4|k = 0, 1, ..., 7}. The BFK protocol can be depicted
as follows. (S1) Alice generates m qubits
⊗m
i=1 |θi〉 and
sends them to Bob, where |θi〉 = |0〉 + eiθi |1〉 and θi is
randomly selected from the set S. (S2) Alice informs the
graph G to Bob. (S3) According to the graph G, Bob
creates a brickwork state |G(θ)〉 by applying CTRL-Z
gates between the qubits from Alice . (S4) If Alice wants
Bob to measure the ith qubit (i = 1, 2, ...,m) of |G(θ)〉,
she sends δi ≡ θi + φ′i + ripi to Bob, where ri ∈ {0, 1}
is randomly selected by Alice and φ′i is a modification of
φi that depends on the previous measurement outcomes.
(S5) Bob measures the ith qubit in the basis {|±δi〉} and
sends Alice the measurement result.
The BFK single-sever BQC protocol [7] shows that Bob
cannot get any information about Alice’s input, output,
or algorithm, but Alice has to be able to prepare single
qubits. To solve this problem, this protocol was modified
to a double-server BQC protocol [7, 15] in which Alice
can be completely classical.
In the double-server BQC protocol [7, 15], classical
client, Alice, can delegate her quantum computation to
two quantum servers, Bob1 and Bob2, who share Bell
pairs but cannot communicate with each other. Without
entanglement distillation, the double-server BQC proto-
col in Ref. [15] can be depicted as follows. (D1) A trusted
center prepares m Bell pairs (|00〉 + |11〉)⊗m and dis-
tributes them to Bob1 and Bob2 respectively. (D2) Alice
sends Bob1 m classical message {θi}, where θi is ran-
domly selected from the set S. (D3) Bob1 measures his
part of the ith Bell pair in the basis {|0〉 ± e−iθi |1〉}(i =
1, 2, · · · ,m). (D4) Bob1 sends Alice the measurement re-
sult {bi}mi=1 ∈ {0, 1}m. States of the particles that Bob2
has are
⊗m
i=1 |θi + bipi〉 after the measurement. (D5) Al-
ice runs the single-server BFK protocol [7] with Bob2,
taking {θi}mi=1 with {θi + bipi}mi=1.
Although it is great to learn that client could be clas-
sical in double-server protocol, the noncommunication
problem between the two servers makes the protocol less
practical. In order to solve this problem, Li et al. [16]
proposed a triple-sever BQC protocol.
Three quantum servers can communicate with each
other and almost classical client, who only need to be
capable of getting access to quantum channels, can dele-
gate her quantum computation to quantum servers while
keeping her data private, in the triple-server BQC proto-
col in Ref. [16]. The procedure can be shown as follows
(see also Fig. 1). (T1) A trusted center prepares n = (2+
δ)m (δ is some fixed number) Bell pairs |ψ0,0(B1k, Ak)〉 =
|00〉+ |11〉(k = 1, 2, · · · , n) and distributes them to Bob1
and Alice respectively. The trusted center prepares an-
other n Bell pairs |ψ0,0(B2l, Al)〉 and distributes them
to Bob2 and Alice respectively. (T2) Alice randomly
transmits the particles Ak, Al to Bob3 and records the
position of them, or throws them away. (T3) Bob3 gets
2m particles from Alice, which are As1 , As2 , ..., Asm and
A′s1 , A
′
s2 , ..., A
′
sm . Bob3 implements Bell state measure-
ment on the particles and sends the outcome (z′si , x
′
si) ∈{0, 1}2 to Alice. (T4) Alice learns that Bob1 and Bob2
share
⊗m
i=1 |ψzsi ,xsi (B1si , B2ti)〉 according to the mea-
surement outcome (z′si , x
′
si). (T5) Alice sends n clas-
sical messages {
∼
θk = (−1)xkθk + zkpi}nk=1 to Bob1,
where {θsi}mi=1 are randomly selected from the set S and
{(z′si , x′si)}mi=1 are depended on Alice at step 4, and if
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} − {s1, s2, · · · , sm}, θk and (zsi , xsi) ∈
{0, 1}2 are selected to make {
∼
θk}ni=1 homogeneously dis-
tributed over all the eight elements of the set S. (T6)
Bob1 measures his particles in the basis {±
∼
θk} and
sends Alice the measurement results {bk}nk=1. (T7) Alice
keeps {bsi}mi=1 from Bob1 and sends classical information
{ti}mi=1 to Bob2. Bob2 only keeps particles {B2ti}mi=1
and relabels them as {B2i}mi=1 in order. Now, Bob2
has
⊗m
i=1 = |θsi + bsipi〉. (T8) Alice runs the single-
server BFK protocol [7] with Bob2, taking {θi}mi=1 with
{θsi + bsipi}mi=1.
(a)      

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Quantum channel
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(b)      
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Classical channel
 
Bob2Bob1 Bob3
(c)      
FIG. 1: The triple-server blind protocol. (a) Alice randomly
selects and forwards qubits to Bob3. (b) Bob3 measures the
qubits which are specified by Alice and returns the measure-
ment result. Alice sends n classical message to Bob1 and
Bob1 performs measurements on his n qubits and reports the
outcome to Alice. (c) Alice notifies Bob2 to hold the corre-
sponding m particles and runs the BFK protocol with Bob2.
The technology of entanglement swapping [17–21] in
our protocol, which is also used in the triple-sever pro-
tocol, plays a crucial role. As one of the most significant
technology of quantum mechanic, entanglement swap-
ping is an essential resource of quantum information ap-
plication, such as quantum teleportation [23, 24], quan-
tum dense coding [25], quantum repeaters [26, 27], and
quantum cryptography [28, 29]. Entanglement swapping
allows two or more independent entangled systems to
build up entanglement to each other by switching their
photons. We will harness the measurement result of the
swapping of two EPR pairs and the state of entangled
pairs after measurement in this protocol.
3The four Bell states are denoted by |ψz,x〉 = (I ⊗
XxZz)(|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉)/√2, where (z, x) ∈ {0, 1}2, X =
|0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0|, and Z = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|. Suppose there
are two EPR pairs (a, b) and (a
′
, b
′
), they are in the Bell
states |ψz,x〉a,b and |ψz′ ,x′ 〉a′ ,b′ , respectively. If we per-
form joint measurement on particles b (a) and b
′
(a
′
) in
the Bell basis [30], the particles a (b) and a
′
(b
′
) would
be entangled and the combined state of them is one of
the four Bell states which is determined by the result of
the joint measurement outcome.
In our protocol, we will use the EPR pairs |ψ0,0〉 =
(|00〉 + |11〉)/√2 to perform entanglement swapping. In
the following, we will take two EPR pairs |ψ0,0〉a,b and
|ψ0,0〉a′ ,b′ as an example to show the entanglement swap-
ping process. The combined state of the two EPR pairs
is |ψ〉a,b,a′ ,b′ = |ψ0,0〉a,b ⊗ |ψ0,0〉a′ ,b′ . After swapping b
and a
′
, the combined state is
|ψ〉a,b,a′ ,b′ =
1
2
(|ψ0,0〉|ψ0,0〉+ |ψ0,1〉|ψ0,1〉
+|ψ1,0〉|ψ1,0〉+ |ψ1,1〉|ψ1,1〉)a,a′ ,b,b′
We can learn that the state of (a, a
′
) ((b, b
′
)) will col-
lapse to the corresponding one of the four Bell states if
(b, b
′
) ((a, a
′
)) is measured. For example, if (b, b
′
) is mea-
sured in Bell basis and the result is (0, 1), the state of
(a, a
′
) will collapse to |ψ0,1〉.
We propose the single-server BQC protocol where Alice
can perform her quantum computation on one quantum
server Bob and keep her input, output and algorithm pri-
vate. Alice does not need any quantum power, such as
quantum memory, performing SWAP gate, or the ability
to generate any quantum state, what she need is to be
capable of getting access to quantum channel. Suppose
that Alice wants to perform the same quantum computa-
tion as that in the three BQC protocols reviewed above.
The protocol can be depicted in steps as follows (see also
Fig. 2).
Step 1 A trusted center prepares 2n, n = (2+δ)m (δ >
0 is some fixed number), Bell states, |ψ0,0(Bk, Ak)〉(k =
1, 2, · · · , 2n), and distributes the particles Bk of each Bell
state to Bob. After Bob gets all the particles, the center
distributes the other particles Ak to Alice.
Step 2 Alice randomly forwards the particles Ak to
Bob and records the position of them, or simply discards
them. Bob places these particles in quantum registers
following the incoming sequence.
Step 3 The probability that at least 2m parti-
cles are sent by Alice is high if the protocol is not
aborted. Suppose the 2m particles are As1 , As2 , · · · , Asm
and At1 , At2 , · · · , Atm , where 1 ≤ si ≤ n < ti ≤
2n, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}. Alice notifies Bob to perform Bell
state measurements on particles Asi and Atj , (i, j) ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,m} and gives their positions in the sequence
of the particles which are from Alice. Bob implements
measurement on the particles and submits the outcome
(z
′
si , x
′
tj ) ∈ {0, 1}2 to Alice.
Step 4 Based on the measurement outcome (z
′
si , x
′
tj ),
where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, Alice gets the combined state
of the corresponding particles Bsi and Btj , which are
the particles that Bob gets from the trusted center, is
|ψzsi ,xtj (Bsi , Btj )〉 and the value of zsi and xtj .
Step 5 Alice sends Bob n classical message {
∼
θk =
(−1)xkθk + zkpi}nk=1, where θk is randomly selected from
the set S, (zk, xk) is depended on Alice at step 4, and
when k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} − {s1, s2, · · · , sm}, (zk, xk) ∈
{0, 1}2 and θk ∈ S are selected to make
∼
θ1,
∼
θ2, · · · ,
∼
θn
homogeneously distributes over all the eight elements of
the set S, which plays a crucial role in the security of the
protocol.
Step 6 Bob measures his first n qubits which are from
the trusted center in the basis {±
∼
θk}, {k = 1, 2, · · · , n},
and sends the measurement outcome {bk}nk=1 to Alice.
Alice simply keeps the result (bs1 , bs2 , · · · , bsm) of the
particles that are entangled with particles in another n
qubits which are also from the trusted center.
Step 7 Alice sends classical message {tj}mt=1 to Bob
and notifies him only keeps particles {Btj}mt=1. Bob re-
labels these particles as B1, B2, · · · , Bm in order and the
combined state of these particles is
⊗m
i=1 |θsi + bsipi〉.
Step 8 Alice and Bob start the BFK protocol from
step 2, taking θi = θi + bsipi, (i = 1, 2, · · · ,m).
(a)        Bob

Alice
Quantum channel
(c)        Bob
 
Alice
Classical channel
(b)        Bob

Alice
Classical channel
FIG. 2: The single-server blind protocol. (a) Alice randomly
selects and forwards qubits to Bob. (b) Bob measures the
qubits which are specified by Alice and returns the result.
Bob performs measurements on his first n qubits and reports
the outcome to Alice. (c) Alice notifies Bob to hold the cor-
responding m particles and runs the BFK protocol with Bob.
In the following, we will show that this protocol is as
secure as the reviewed triple-sever BQC protocol, and
Alice can detect if Bob is not cooperating with very high
probability.
Alice sends Bob classical message {δi}mi=1, where{δi =
θsi + bsipi+φ
′
i + ripi}mi=1. Bob has the outcome (z
′
si , x
′
tj ),
then he can get the combined state |ψzsi ,xtj (Bsi , Btj )〉,
but he does not know which are the two corresponding
particles Bsi and Btj . If the n classical message {
∼
θk}nk=1
are homogeneously distributed on all the eight elements
4of the set S, Bob can learn nothing about {θsi}mi=1 or
{φi}mi=1. With the information of {
∼
θk}nk=1 Bob still can-
not get any information about {θsi}mi=1, because he does
not know the corresponding {si}mi=1 and {tj}mj=1 which
are randomly selected by Alice. Without the information
{θsi + bsipi}mi=1 Bob can get nothing about {φi}mi=1.
However, Bob may get partial information about
{θsi}mi=1 or {φi}mi=1, if the distribution of {
∼
θk}nk=1 is not
homogeneously distributed over all the elements of set
S, especially when they are only a part of the eight
possibilities. With the angles {
∼
θk}nk=1 from Alice and
the measurement outcome (z
′
si , x
′
tj ), Bob can learn the
set Si(i = 1, 2, · · · ,m) by computing {(−1)xsi (
∼
θ1 −
ztjpi), (−1)xsi (
∼
θ2 − ztjpi), · · · , (−1)xsi (
∼
θn − ztjpi)}. Then
Bob learns that the elements of Si are distributed un-
equally or take fewer than eight possibilities, which also
makes the outcomes of Alice’s θsi occur unequally or take
less than eight possibilities. Of course, the possibilities
of θsi are certainly fewer than eight if the size of n is less
than eight. The probability that Bob can learn informa-
tion about Alice’s θsi is increased.
Now, we focus on Alice’s ability to detect if Bob sends
her wrong measurement result in purpose. On the first
step of the protocol, trusted center generates h decoy
Bell states, |ψz,x(Ah1.Ah2)〉, where (z, x) ∈ {0, 1}2. The
center sends the first particle of Bell states to Alice, and
then send the other particles to her after she has received
all the first particles, and tells her the state of these Bell
states. In step 2, Alice randomly forwards the particles
of decoy Bell states to Bob and records the position of
it, or simply discard them. Bob places these particles in
quantum registers following the incoming sequence. In
step 3, suppose Alice asks Bob to perform Bell measure-
ment on particles of l (l < h) decoy Bell states which are
specified by Alice, and Bob sends result to Alice. Alice
can check the result from Bob and the state information
from trusted center. If Bob spoils, he will get caught with
the probability 3/4 of every Bell state. He gets caught
if Alice finds that at least one output is incorrect, so the
probability of an incorrect output being accepted is 4−l.
The client requires the ability to get qubits from
trusted center and forward them to quantum server in
our protocol above. The client can be completely classi-
cal if the first two steps are changed as following:
Step 1
′
A trusted center prepares 2n, n = (2 + δ)m
(δ > 0 is fixed number), Bell states, |ψ0,0(Bk, Ak)〉(k =
1, 2, · · · , 2n), and distributes the particles Bk of each Bell
state to Bob. After Bob gets all the particles, the trusted
center randomly selects particles from the second parti-
cles Ak (k = 1, 2, . . . , 2n) and discards them, and sends
the rest particles of Ak to the server Bob.
Step 2
′
Trusted center notifies Alice which particles of
Ak are discarded and which are sent to Bob, and keeps
this information secret to Bob.
Since it is impossible for blind quantum computation
with only classical client and single server [22], trusted
center is essential if client is classical and only one server
is involved. The role of trusted center in the future
BQC protocol is similar to Certificate Authority(CA)
in “E-commerce” today. CA is a trusted third party
trusted both by the party who is the subject of the cer-
tificate and by the party who relies on the certificate,
while trusted center in BQC protocol can be treated as a
third party trusted both by classical clients and quantum
servers. Therefore, the blind quantum computation may
work in “Cloud + E-commerce” style, our single-server
and classical-client blind quantum computation protocol
might become a key ingredient of real-life application in
the future. However, the security of E-commerce is com-
putational security, while blind quantum computation is
unconditionally security.
In conclusion, our protocol shows that by using the
technology of entanglement swapping, the almost classi-
cal client, who does not require any quantum technology
or resources and only needs to be able to receive and
send qubits, can delegate quantum computation to one
quantum server, while keeping the input, output and al-
gorithm private. Our protocol is as security as the triple-
server protocol, and only one server is required which
makes it easier to implement and more practical. The
client is completely classical if trusted center helps client
to send particles to server and tells client which particles
are sent or discarded. To consider the practical applica-
tion, the “Cloud + E-commerce” style may be worked
for blind quantum computation in the first generation of
quantum computations.
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